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a/k/a Oneil Dozier, a/k/a Jerrod Dozier, a/k/a Jerrod O. O'neil, a/k/a Jermaine Lamar 
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*The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge 
 Appellant Jerrod Dozier (“Dozier”) appeals from his conviction and sentence in 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. He argues that 
his conviction should be vacated because: (1) the evidence presented by the government 
was insufficient for a rational jury to convict him; (2) the jury instructions were 
prejudicial; and (3) the District Court procedurally and substantively erred at sentencing. 
We will affirm. 
I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 On February 1, 2007, Paul Surine and several of his family members and 
associates were arrested as part of a Pennsylvania State Police investigation into a large 
crack cocaine distribution operation run out of Surine’s trailer in Tioga County, 
Pennsylvania. In the course of their investigation, the State Police learned the identities of 
several of Surine’s alleged suppliers in the Rochester, New York area. On October 22, 
2009, a grand jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania returned indictments charging 
Dozier, Jermaine Williams, and Gregory O’Neal with one count of conspiracy to 
distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine and one count of distributing fifty grams 
or more of crack cocaine. On July 28, 2011, a second indictment was issued naming only 
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Dozier and Williams – O’Neal having decided to plead guilty – and raising the amounts 
for each count to 280 grams or more. 
 Dozier’s trial commenced on October 2, 2012. The government called numerous 
witnesses who testified to the Surines’ distribution operation, the methods by which they 
obtained their cocaine, and Dozier’s involvement in the distribution. After the parties 
rested, the District Court supplied jury instructions with no objections from either party. 
The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. On May 21, 2013, the District Court 
held a sentencing hearing. After analyzing Dozier’s background and criminal history, the 
District Court adopted the Guideline range of 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment 
calculated in the Presentence Investigation Report. At the conclusion of the sentencing 
hearing, the District Court sentenced Dozier to 168 months’ imprisonment and five years’ 
supervised release on each count, to run concurrently, and imposed a total fine of $1,000 
and a $200 special assessment. This timely appeal follows. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 When evaluating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we review the record in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, and determine whether any rational trier of fact 
could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Caraballo-
Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). “[W]e review the evidence as a 
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whole, not in isolation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 480 (3d Cir. 2010)). We must accept the jury’s verdict “if there is 
substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to uphold the 
jury’s decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 When evaluating a challenge to jury instructions that was not preserved below, we 
review for plain error. United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2005).  We 
also review unpreserved challenges to a sentence for plain error.  United States v. Berger, 
689 F.3d 297, 299 (3d Cir. 2012).  Under plain error review, this Court must determine: 
(1) if there is an error; (2) if the error is plain; and (3) if the error affected substantial 
rights. Dobson, 419 F.3d at 236. If all three elements are met, we may exercise our 
discretion to grant relief if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. 
III. 
A. 
 We first consider Dozier’s contention that the government presented insufficient 
evidence to convict him.  The existence of a conspiracy can be proven through 
“reasonable and logical inference” and circumstantial evidence presented by the 
government. United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ellis, 595 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 
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1979)). The government must prove that the activities could not occur unless a 
“preconceived scheme or common understanding” existed between the parties. Id. 
 Here, Dozier presents a number of arguments supporting his contention that the 
jury could not find him guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. His principal 
argument is that the relationship between Dozier and Surine never advanced beyond a 
“buyer-seller relationship” and, as such, he could not be convicted of conspiracy under 
United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999), and United States v. Pressler, 
256 F.3d 144, 151-57 (3d Cir. 2001). Dozier points to several facts existing in Gibbs and 
Pressler that he contends distinguish the conspiracy in those cases from Dozier’s alleged 
conspiracy with Surine. Dozier observes the large amount of crack sold, the level and 
style of communication, the existence of credit, the reliance on one party to process 
powder cocaine into crack for the other party, and the solicitation of advice that existed in 
those cases, but not here. While Dozier is correct that his case differs from Gibbs and 
Pressler, we conclude that the facts here did establish something more than a mere buyer-
seller relationship. 
 Dozier traveled with other individuals on numerous occasions to sell crack cocaine 
to the Surine family at their property. At trial, witnesses testified that Dozier, both 
individually and alongside his co-travelers, sold large amounts of crack cocaine to Surine, 
and “most of the time” the sales were for amounts exceeding one ounce. App. at 139. 
Even after Dozier was no longer permitted to enter the Surine trailer due to an argument 
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with one member of the family, he still traveled to the trailer with Williams and O’Neal 
on at least twenty occasions. A reasonable jury could determine that this arrangement 
indicates that Dozier’s drugs were being sold by Williams or O’Neal, implying both 
collaboration and the existence of a rudimentary credit system.  
 Dozier also points to United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2008), where 
the Seventh Circuit held that evidence of as many as six or seven drug transactions, 
totaling thirty to thirty-five ounces of cocaine, was insufficient to prove a conspiracy, and 
instead only proved a regular pattern of purchase and sale. Id. at 567. However, this case 
is distinguishable from Colon due to the number of transactions involved and the 
additional facts present. In Colon, the court found no evidence that there were any more 
than seven total transactions. Here, Paul Surine testified that O’Neal and Williams would 
routinely travel to the Surine trailer two or more times per week for a period of up to 
eighteen months, and that Dozier would accompany the pair on more than fifty percent of 
those trips – resulting in evidence of a total number of visits far greater than in Colon. 
Further, testimony was presented indicating that Dozier was present for and may have 
been a participant in a conversation with Williams and Surine about distribution 
operations. 
 A rational jury could conclude that Dozier participated in a drug conspiracy after 
considering evidence of Dozier’s repeated trips to the Surine residence, his continued 
trips to the residence even after being banned from entering the trailer, his presence for 
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conversations regarding Surine’s distribution network, and his presence with Williams 
and O’Neal for every one of his transactions with the Surines. As such, Dozier has not 
overcome the significant hurdle for a successful sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. 
 Dozier also contends that the evidence was insufficient because it indicated that 
he, O’Neal, and Williams were in competition with one another. In support of this 
contention, Dozier leans heavily on a portion of the testimony of Lisa Lehman, Surine’s 
live-in girlfriend, stating that O’Neal, Williams, and Dozier were in competition with 
each other rather than in collaboration. However, Lehman also testified that Dozier never 
came to the Surine residence without O’Neal and Williams, she “assumed they knew 
what they were doing,” “they had to know each other and had to know what was going 
on,” and stated that only one of the three would undergo a transaction with the Surines on 
a particular visit. App. at 186-87. Lehman’s testimony that only one of the three would 
actually come with drugs and leave with the Surines’ money indicates that the three were 
not in competition with one another. There is no evidence that one of the three ever tried 
to offer a more competitive price than the others or otherwise engaged in any other 
pattern of behavior one would expect from business competitors. In fact, Lehman 
testified that O’Neal and Williams did, for a period of time, pool their resources to 
purchase drugs. Id. We conclude that a rational jury could reasonably view Lehman’s 
testimony as supporting a conspiracy, particularly in light of the lack of any other 
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evidence suggesting that the three were in competition with one another. As such, 
Dozier’s sufficiency claim fails on this theory as well. 
B. 
 Dozier’s second contention is ohhhthat the District Court’s jury instructions were 
flawed because they failed to include the necessary elements of co-conspirator liability. 
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), sets forth the elements required for a 
defendant’s conviction of a substantive offense where a co-conspirator personally 
committed the offense. Pinkerton requires:  (1) the existence of a criminal conspiracy of 
which the defendant is a part; (2) that one or more members of the conspiracy committed 
the substantive offense; and (3) the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of 
the criminal conspiracy. United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2001). “[A] 
jury must find that a party to the conspiracy committed a crime both ‘in furtherance of’ 
and ‘as a foreseeable consequence of’ the conspiracy to find a co-conspirator guilty of a 
substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator.” United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 
897 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646). 
 Because Dozier did not first raise objections to the jury instructions before the 
District Court, we review for plain error. Dobson, 419 F.3d at 236.  We struggle to 
conclude, as Dozier urges, that the District Court’s issuance of jury instructions that 
differ somewhat from this Circuit’s model instructions is a plain error. Although the 
District Court did not state each element in the fashion set forth in the model instructions, 
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its instructions did specify the necessary elements. We offer trial courts the flexibility to 
set forth jury instructions as they see fit, provided that they do not misstate the law and 
adequately submit the issues to the jury. United States v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 261 (3d 
Cir. 2012). Because we conclude that the District Court’s jury instructions did not 
misstate the law and adequately submitted the elements of the offense to the jury, we do 
not find plain error. While the District Court’s instructions could have been clearer (as 
they are in the model instructions), potential errors of clarity are, by their nature, not 
“plain.”  
 Additionally, Dozier raises a second challenge to the jury instructions, arguing that 
the District Court should have specifically instructed the jury that they must find Dozier 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the conspiracy charge. We review the adequacy of 
the trial court’s jury instructions as a whole. Dobson, 419 F.3d at 239. The record reflects 
that the standard of reasonable doubt to render a guilty verdict was stated elsewhere in 
the jury instructions. In addition, the instructions stated that the jury was to consider the 
instructions as a whole. The failure to reiterate the reasonable-doubt requirement for each 
individual count does not constitute plain error. See, e.g., United States v. De Lazo, 497 
F.2d 1168, 1171 n.6 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that no plain error existed when the entirety 
of the trial court’s jury instructions properly instructed the jury as to each individual 
charge). We therefore conclude that the District Court did not plainly err in failing to 
provide a reasonable doubt instruction specifically for the conspiracy charge.  
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C. 
 Dozier argues finally that the District Court procedurally erred in its sentencing 
decision and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We review these 
contentions for plain error, because Dozier failed to object to the alleged errors at the 
sentencing hearing.  Berger, 689 F.3d at 299. Dozier’s procedural error contention rests 
solely on the District Court’s comments regarding Dozier’s criminal record that “Dozier 
was not affected by his prior contacts with law enforcement.” App. at 418. Dozier 
contends that this statement constitutes a factual error, alleging that his other criminal 
convictions occurred after the timeframe covered in this offense. Dozier’s contention that 
his sentence was substantively unreasonable stems from the same alleged mistake. 
 Our appellate review of a sentence consists of “ensur[ing] that the district court 
committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly 
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to 
consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or 
failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 
567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Here, Dozier argues that the 
District Court selected a sentence based upon clearly erroneous facts. But even if the 
court was mistaken – and the government provides evidence that the District Court was 
correct in stating that Dozier’s extensive history of criminal activity overlaps with or 
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predates his drug trafficking activities with the Surine family – the statements are not 
factual findings that contributed to the sentence.  Rather, they were mere remarks as a 
part of a lengthier statement. 
 The second prong of our test under Tomko and Gall is a determination of 
substantive reasonableness, in which we consider the totality of the circumstances and the 
sentence. Id. We will affirm a procedurally sound sentence “unless no reasonable 
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  Id.  Here again, not only did the sentence fall 
within the Guidelines range – which Dozier does not contend was improperly calculated 
– but it was the lowest recommended sentence. Given the two crimes for which Dozier 
was convicted and the amount of crack cocaine involved, we cannot say that no 
reasonable sentencing court would impose a 168-month sentence upon Dozier.  We 
therefore do not conclude that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. 
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Dozier’s conviction and sentence. 
